US Army in the Iraq War Volume 2 Surge and Withdrawal

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1932/thumbnail.jp

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011

The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army\u27s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country\u27s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to “surge” additional forces to Iraq, and reviews the conduct of the “surge” and its aftermath. This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of handpicked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, represents the U.S. Government\u27s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/books/1019/thumbnail.jp

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army\u27s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country\u27s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to “surge” additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the “surge” and its aftermath in the second volume. This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of handpicked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, represents the U.S. Government\u27s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/books/1018/thumbnail.jp

Patchwork War: Command, Human Capital, and Counterinsurgency

Insurgencies are historically protracted, decentralized, and complex and thus provide a unique environment where individual local commanders exercise considerable autonomy and authority. This decentralized environment then affords commanders the opportunity to conduct operations in significantly different ways. This dissertation proposes that differences in commanders’ human capital accumulation predict unit-level COIN variation during training and employment that is not fully explained by their environment. These different ways to wage counterinsurgency produce measurably different short and long-term violence levels, which contribute toward the larger COIN outcome. To test this theory I examine brigade and battalion counterinsurgency by the U.S. Army in the Iraq War. An original survey was conducted of over 7000 Army officers to proxy unit-level priorities and strategies. A unique database compiled all unit rotations and their location for the entire war, and at the unit-level, matched survey responses, incidents of violence, and commander’s human capital variables. Local district level data for terrain, ethnicity, and population density accounts for contextual differences for each unit. The analysis reveals that while unit structure and local environments explain to some extent why units trained and operated differently, commanders’ human capital further predicts significant variation in COIN training, operational employment, and violence outcomes and these findings obtain with and without survey-related measures. Specifically, commanders’ latent rather than developed human capital, most significantly predicts this variation, whether measured as source of commission and level of scholarship or the selectivity of the commanders’ undergraduate institution. The effect of unit structure is not consistent with mechanization theory and can be directly influenced by the unit commander. Ultimately, this variation persists throughout the war, despite exogenous national level changes such as doctrine, troop levels, or strategy. The implications of these findings confront military unit rotation policy, the utility of professional military education, and wartime assessment, adaptation, and innovation. While additional data for local insurgent and counterinsurgent activity would bolster these findings, the scope of this unique data and the significant findings further the field of civil wars, counterinsurgency, and military innovation

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War

The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army's initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country's slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to "surge" additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the "surge" and its aftermath in the second volume